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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

"

easily be misunderstood when the
action against the third party af:(ects
a legal or equitable property interest
of the debtor.
·

TERMINATION OF PRIME LEASE
AFFECTING DEBTOR'S
SUBLEASE-A VIOLATION OF
THE AUTOMATIC STAY

The automatic stay is one of the
In re 48th Street Steakhouse, Inc.
most important debtor protections
1
A significant decision by the,
provided by the Bankruptcy Code.
It is generally u1;1derstood that the Court of Appeals for the Second
automatic stay only protects debtors Circuit, In re 48th Street Steakin ba~ptcy and, therefore, does house, lrtc., 3 serves as a reminder
not .preclude legal actions taken of the.breadth of the automatic ·stay
against an entity that is not the sub- as it protects property of the estate
ject of a bankruptcy case. For exam- from adverse consequences of acple, the filing of a chapter 71iquida'- tions among two nonbankrupt entition or chapter 11 reorganization ties. In that case, the court 6f appetition of a debtor usually does peals held that a landlord's act of
not prevent a creditor from taking sending to a nonbankrupt tenant noaction against a guarantor of the tice of termination of ~ prime lease
obligation that is not itself in bank- ,due to nonpayment of refit .violated
ruptcy. 2 However, this basic dis- the automatic stay in connection
tinction between actions against the with ~e bankruptcy case of a- subdebtor and actions against a third lessee who had possession of the
party that is not in bankruptcy could premises.
In 1975, 48th Street Steakhouse,
* Special Counsel to the law firm of Inc., purchased a restaur~nt busiKaye, Scholer, fiennan, Hays & Handler,
New York, N.Y.; member of the National ness in New Yprk City from Char• ley O's. Gorp. The sale included
Bankruptcy Conference.
** Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished Charley O's furniture, fixtures, and
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, N.Y.; equipment located at the .premises,
Counsel to the law firm of Fried, Frank, as well as the right to use the trade
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York, name. Charley O's had been leasing
N.Y.; member of the National Bankruptcy
the premises from the landlord,
Conference.
1
See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
Rockefeller
Center, Inc., which ter2
See, e.g., Otoe County Nat'! Bank v.
minated
its
lease
with .Charley 0' s
W&P Trucking, Inc., 754 F.2d 881 (lOth
Cir. 1985); In re Precision Colors, Inc., 36
Bankr. 429 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
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3

835 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1987).
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and entered into a new lease with ises to 48th S~reet with the land48th Street at the time that 48th lord's consent. The sublease was
Street bought the restaurant busi- coterminous with the escrow agreeness. The new lease term was to ment in that both would terminate
expire in 1994.
upon the satisfaction of 48th Street's
Charley 0' s agreed to finance the debt to Charley O's at which time
purchase of the restaurant and, ac- the prime lease would be reassigned
cordingly, 48th Street executed and to 48th Street. 48th Street remained
delivered to Charley 0' s a promis- in continuous possession of the
sory note ,in the amount of premises, and pursuant to the terms
$207,289. The note was secured by of the sublease, paid rent directly to
a security interest in 48th Street's the landlord.
chattels, fixtures, and equipment.
In July 1983, when rent was in
As additional security, 48th Street arrears, 48th Street and its parent
· assigned its lease of the premises to corporation, American Hospitality
I.S:H. Liquidating.Corp., an affili- Management Co., filed chapter 11
ate of Charley 0' s, thus rendering petitions. One month later, AmeriI.S.H. the prime tenant under the can Hospitality tendered a payment
lease. The landlord consented to this to the landlord on behalf of 48th
assignment.
Street for use and occupation of the
A provision of the assignment premises for the postpetition period
provided tliat tl}e landlord would of July, but the tender was rejected
consent to the further reassignment and the landlord then served I. S.H.,
of the lease back to 48th Street "the nominal prime tenant, " 5 with
"whenever requested by the As- a notice of default which stated that
signee and the Assignor. " 4 The re- if the arrears were not paid within
assignment was to be accomplished
five days, the landlord would termiby means of a document entitled
nate the lease. I.S.H. did not pay
· ''Assignment witlj. Consent and Rethe requested arrears.
lease' ' that provided for the lease to
be reassigned to 48th Street as soon
The Bankruptcy Court's Holding
as 48th Street had satisfied all of
48th Street was also served with
its financial obligations to Charley
·a
copy
of the default notice and, on
O's. In the meantime, the "AssignSeptember
1, 1983, commenced an
ment with Consent and Release"
adversary
proceeding
requesting,
was to be held in escrow by I. S. H.
among
other
relief,
that
the
landlord
until the full payment of 48th
taKing
any
action
be
enjoined
from
Street's obligations owed to Charley
with
respect
to
48th
Street's
interest
O's. To enable 48th Street to occupy
the premises pending reassignment in the lease, "and that 48th Street
ofi:he lease, I.S.H. sublet the prem- be declared the prime tenant under
4

/d. at429.

5
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the lease.' ' 6 At a hearing held before
the bankruptcy judge on that same
day, it was learned that the landlord
had already sent a notice of lease
termination to I.S.H. dated September 1, 1983, which informed I.S.H.
that the lease would terminate in
three days because the arrears had
not been paid within five days after
the previous default notice. Following the hearing, the bankruptcy
court issued a preliminary injunction that enjoined the landlord
"from interfering with and/or terminating any right, title and interest
that the Debtor may enjoy with regard to the lease or premises. " 7 The
jnjum;tion stayed the effect of the
lease termination notice.
Almost two years later, 48th
Street moved for summary judgment arguing that the landlord's act
of sending the lease termination notice violated the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code and,
therefore, the lease termination notice was ineffective. 48th Street also
sought a declaration that "upon the
payment of all arrears due and owing under the ... Lease and/or Sublease, 48th Street will be the prime
tenant under the Lease.' ' 8 The bankruptcy judge granted 48th Street's
motion for summary judgment, 9
holding that the 48th Street lease
constituted property of the debtor's
estate pursuant to Section 541(a) of
6
7

/d.
/d.

The Findings of the Court of
Appeals
The court of appeals summarized
the positions of the parties throughout the entire litigation. The landlord had maintained that I. S. H. was
its prime tenant and that 48th
Street's only interest in the premises
was that of a sublessee. In essence,
the landlord's position was that,
since the prime lease between it and
I.S.H. was not property of 48th
Street'_s bankruptcy estate, and that
the prime tenant was not in bankruptcy, the automatic stay did not
prevent the landlord from terminating the prime lease. In contrast,
48th Street'"s position was that the
assignment of its lease to I. S. H. was
intended as collateral, and therefore
it retained an "equitable interest in
the lease which was greater than that
of a sublessee.'' 12 The bankruptcy
court had held that even if 48th
Street was nothing but a sublessee,
its interest was still prote~ted by the
automatic stay because a sublease
10

See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
835 F.2d at 429, quoting from 11
U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
12
835 F .2d at 430.
11

8[d.
9
/d. See 61
S.D.N.Y. 1986).

the Bankruptcy Code, 10 and, therefore, that the landlord's attempt to
terminate the lease as to I.S.H.
"violated 48th Street's right to an
automatic stay of 'any act to obtain
possession of property of the estate.' " 11 The landlord appealed to
the district court, which affirmed
the granting of summary judgment,
and then to the court of appeals.

Bankr.

182 (Bankr.
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constitutes property of the bankruptcy estate. The court of appeals
agreed with that holding but objected to "what appears to be a factual
finding of the bankruptcy court that,
"in any event, the assignment of 48th
Street's lease to I.S.H. was indeed
intend~ as collateral. " 13 Since the
case _came to the court on a motion
for summary judgment, the court
had to ''view the facts and draw all
reasonable inferences therefrom in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'' 14 Therefore, for the
purpose of the appeal, the court of
appeals accepted the landord' s contention that I.S.H. was the prime
tenant and that 48th Street was a
sublessee, without any regard for
the position that the lease was assigned as additional collaterat to secure 48th Street's obligations. This
left the court of appeals with the
dual issues of whether the sublease
constituted property of the estate
and whether the sending of the termination notice to I.S.H. violated
the automatic stay with respect to
48th Street's bankruptcy case.
Analysis of the Dual Issues
The court of appeals began its
analysis by noting that:
The courts are in agreement that unexpired leasehold interests, including subleases, constitute property of
the bankrupt estate .... 15
ll[d.
14
ld. The court cited, e.g., Knight v.
U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 10-11 (2d
Cir. 1986), cen. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1570.
15
ld. The court cited, e.g., In re American lnt'l Airways, Inc., 44 Bankr. 143, 145
(Bankr, E. D. Pa. 1984).
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The court· went further to indicate
that ''a mere possessory interest in
real property, without any accompanying legal interest, is sufficient
to trigger the protection of the automatic stay" 16 that stays "any act to
obtain possession of property of the
estate or of property from the eslflte
or to exercise control over property
of the estfite.'' 17 The court of appeals rejected as "simply wrong"
the landlord's contentipn that the
sending of the termination notice' to
I.S.H. did not violate the automatic
stay "because termination of
I.S.H. 's lease would have h;td no
effect on 48th Street's sublease. " 18
The court of appeals endorsed the
bankruptcy judge's observation that
"it is axiomatic that, under New
York law, when a prime lease falls,
so does the sublease. " 19
The court of appeals also rejected
the landlord's contention that the
termination ofi.S.H. 's lease would
have. resulted in a "merger" between the estates of the landlord and
I.S.H. while leaving 48th Street's
sublease unimp~ired. The court of
appeals observed that the cases20
upon which the landlord relied for
the merger doctrine involved in16
ld. The court cited, e.g., In re Onio's
Italian Restaurant Corp., 42 Bankr. 319,
320-321 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
7
• 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3).
18
835 F .2d at 430.
19
ld. The court cited the bankruptcy
court opinion, 61 Bankr. at 189 (citing, e.g.,
34 N.Y. Jur. Landlord and Tenant § 270
(1964).
20
The landlord relied upon, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hellinger, 246 A.D.
7, 284 N.E.2d 432 (1st Dep't 1935), aff'd,
272 N.Y. 24, 3 N.E.2d (1936).
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stances where the prime tenant surrendered its lease to the landlord
pursuant to a separate agreement,
and ~ot where the landlord attempts
unilaterally to terminate the prime
tenant's lease for nonpayment of
rent. In 48th Street's situation, termination of the prime lease would
have resulted in tyrmination of the
sublease.
Since the landlord attempted to
terminate I.S.ll 's lease, which
·would have destroyed 48th Street's
subtenancy, the bankruptcy court
''correctly held that Landlord's termination notice violated the automatic stay with respect to 48th Street
and was therefore void.' ' 21
A further argument of the landlord was that "although the automatic stay is designed to preserve
the debtor's estate, its protection
should not extend to non-bankrupt
third parties which are somehow
related to the debtor.' ' 22 In essence,
the effect of the court's holding is
thaf the landlord is precluded from
taking action against I.S.H., which
itself has not filed a bankruptcy petition, and the landlord argued that
such an effect is improper. The
court of appeals rejected the landlord's position:
While -it is true that I.S.H. is an
incidental beneficiary of our decision, this result is permissible where
a non-debtor's interest in property is
21
835 F.2d at 431. The court cited L.
King, Collier on Bankruptcy§ 362.11 (15th
ed. 1987) ("actions taken in violation of the
stay are void and without effect").
22
835F.2dat431.

int~rtwined, as in the preseq.t case,
with that of a bankrupt debtor. If
action taken again.st the non-bankfupt
party would inevitably have ~ adverse impact on property of the estate, then such action -should be
barred by the automatic stay.' ' 23

Although the court of appeals believed that the landlord's position on
the appeal was ess~ntially without
merit, it refused to impose sanctions24 against the landlord for instituting what 48th Street termed a
frivolous appeal. "[W]e do not consider the appeal to be so frivolous
or such an abuse of the judicial
process as to warrant the imposition
of·sanctions. '' 25
Conclusion
The lesson to be learned from the
\
48th Street Steakhouse case is that
what may at first appear to be a
dispute between two parties who are
not in bankruptcy~ay, nonetheless,
constitute a violation of the automatic stay if it would adversely affect
the property _interest of a debtor in
bankruptcy.
1
It is significant that the court of
appeals disregarded, for the purpose of the appeal, th~ fact that the
23
/d. The court cited In re Bialac, 712
F.2d426, 431-432 (9thCir. 1983)(automatic stay prohibited creditor from foreclosing
on property in which debtor had right of
redemption, even though property was
owned by nonbankrupt individuals); In re
Metal Center, Inc., 31 Bankr. 458, 462
(Ba~. D. Conn. 1983) ("the debtor's protect~on must be extended to enjoin litigation
agamst others if the result would be binding
upon the debtor's estate").
24
See ,Bankruptcy Rule 9011.
25
835 F .2d at 431.
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debtor assigned the prime lease to
I.S.H. for collateral only. Otherwise, the court could have easily
disposed of the case on the ground
that the debtor was the true "owner'' of the prime lease subject to the
security interest of I.S.H. and that
termination of the prime lease
would be a di!ect taking of the debtor's property. However, by focusing on 48th Street as a subtenant
only, and by considering the lease

182
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termination as an action by the landlord against the nonb~mkrupt prime
tenant, the court made it clear that
even an incidental deprivation of the
debtor's interest in the premises that
may result from actions among nonbankrupt entities triggers the application of the automatic stay. This
case underscores the wide reach of
the automatic stay and demonstrates
why it is considered such a fundamental debtor protection under the
Bankruptcy Code.

